Key terms in plain words
- Eligible votersבעלי זכות בחירה (בז"ב)
- Everyone on the voter register for a ballot box. Citizens who moved abroad stay on the register, so this count is too high (see "Voters living abroad").
- Turnout
- Votes cast ÷ eligible voters. Here it is counted per ballot box, without the "double envelope" votes (soldiers, diplomats, patients, prisoners), so it is a few points below the official national figure.
- Potential supporters
- The people who would vote for a list if everyone voted: the list's voters plus the non-voters who lean towards it. Nobody observes this number; it has to be estimated.
- Participation rate
- A list's votes ÷ its potential supporters. A rate of 60% means 6 in 10 of the list's would-be voters actually voted.
- Hypothetical 1
- "Non-voters lean like their neighbours." In each ballot box, split the people who didn't vote in the same proportions as the people who did. A list then has a low rate only if its voters live in low-turnout places. This is the cautious estimate.
- Hypothetical 2
- "Each list has its own rate everywhere." Find one rate per list that best explains why some boxes turn out more than others with the same vote mix. Statistically this is an ecological regression. It can find gaps within a box, but it is fragile.
- Full-turnout Knesset
- Seats if every list got all its potential supporters, allocated with the 3.25% threshold and the Bader-Ofer (D'Hondt) formula.
- Ballot-box sector
- Arab box: Arab lists won over half the valid votes. Haredi box: Shas + UTJ won over half. General: all other boxes.
- Netanyahu bloc
- The lists that backed Netanyahu in coalition talks after that election: Likud, Shas, UTJ and the religious right, plus Kulanu and Yisrael Beiteinu in the years they sat with him.
Participation by list
How many of each list's potential supporters voted
Dots right of the grey line are lists whose supporters vote more than average. A dot at 100% means the model hit its ceiling: a warning sign, not a measurement. Hover a row for all estimates.
Vote share now vs. if everyone voted
% of the vote; lists over ~1%
Seats with the 3.25% threshold and Bader-Ofer. Surplus-vote agreements are ignored, so "actual" can be off by one seat from the official result.
Would full turnout change the government?
The one result that holds across methods: the Arab lists gain. Arab-majority ballot boxes vote at 43–64%, against 62–68% in general boxes. Under Hypothetical 1 the Arab lists gain 1–6 seats in every election. From 2019 on, those seats come mostly out of the Netanyahu bloc: in 2022 it falls from a majority to 60 seats.
Netanyahu-bloc seats, actual and at full turnout
Exercise: only non-Haredi Jewish supporters turn out
The scenario above raises turnout for everyone. Here only the supporters of non-Haredi Jewish lists are brought to 100% (Likud, the centre, the left, the religious right, Yisrael Beiteinu). The Arab lists and the Haredi lists (Shas, UTJ) keep exactly the votes they got. Think of a mobilisation campaign aimed only at the Jewish non-Haredi public.
Netanyahu-bloc seats when only non-Haredi Jewish supporters turn out
Where the turnout gap comes from
Ballot-box turnout by sector
votes cast ÷ eligible voters, per election
Turnout by neighbourhood socio-economic level
Haredi boxes always vote most (69–75%). Arab-box turnout swings the most: 43% in 2021, when the Joint List split, and 64% in 2020, when the united list won 15 seats. In general boxes turnout climbs with the neighbourhood's socio-economic cluster, from about 50% to 71%. Arab and Haredi boxes show no such climb.
Fifteen years of participation rates
Lists come and go, so they are grouped into families. Each cell is the family's votes ÷ its potential supporters.
Centre = Kadima, Yesh Atid, Hatnuah, Kulanu, Blue and White, New Hope, National Unity. Religious right = National Union, Jewish Home, Yachad, New Right, Yamina, Otzma, Religious Zionism. Arab lists = Hadash, Balad, Ra'am, Ta'al and their joint lists.
Voters living abroad
Israel has no postal voting, and citizens who move abroad stay on the register. So every ballot box carries some "phantom" voters who could not vote even if they wanted to. The CBS publishes a national estimate before each election:
Taking them out raises 2022 turnout among people actually living in Israel from the official 70.6% to about 77%. Abroad voters are not spread evenly. The census shows where they are: compare each town's registered voters with its adult residents in the 2022 census.
Registered voters per adult resident, by town
2022 register ÷ census-2022 adults; towns over 10,000 people; dot size = population
A ratio of 1.25 means the register has 25% more names than there are adults living in the town. The excess grows with the share of residents born in Europe, mostly the former USSR (correlation among Jewish towns). Tel Aviv, Ra'anana and Eilat are high for other reasons: Anglo emigration, young people registered at a parent's address, seasonal workers. Haredi and Arab towns sit near 1.
Participation rates after removing the excess,
each box's eligible count cut by its town's 2022 excess registration (grey = before). Before 2022 this assumes the same town pattern.
Expats flying in to vote (Knesset 26, 27 Oct 2026)
Israelis abroad can vote only by flying home. Ahead of the 2026 election this became an organised effort. The AID Coalition's Fly&Vote project estimates 53,000–67,000 expats will come. Its survey of about 23,000 Israelis abroad found 80% intending to travel (48% from the US, 37% from Europe). Only 14% of them said they flew in for 2022. The sample is self-selected, and Arkia's CEO says flights are not full. Likud petitioned against the project; the Elections Committee rejected the petition after the organisers said they do not fund tickets. Nobody has measured how these voters will vote. The ballot-box data can answer three narrower questions.
1. Where the voters living abroad are registered
estimated abroad registrants = 2022 register − census adults, by town; top 15 of ~650,000. Bar label: Netanyahu-bloc share of the town's 2022 vote.
2. If they vote like their home towns
2022 vote shares, weighted by each town's abroad registrants, vs. the national result
Tel Aviv alone holds about 13% of the abroad registrants, and Haifa, Ra'anana, Herzliya and Ramat Gan add more. So "voting like home" tilts against the bloc, but only by about 4 points (44.7% vs. 48.3%). Expats are not their home towns. Reports suggest the post-2022 emigrants lean further to the centre-left, and some fly in for the bloc. The simulation below therefore varies the split.
3. Netanyahu-bloc seats with fly-in voters added to the 2022 result
rows: fly-in voters; columns: share voting against the bloc. Within each camp, votes split like the home-town profile. 2022 computed result: seats.
Fewest extra votes for one list that would have moved one seat between the camps in 2022, on the computed allocation (surplus agreements ignored).
What the surveys say
The Israel National Election Study (INES, Tel Aviv University) interviews the same people before and after each election. Before: "which list would you vote for?" After: "did you vote?". So for every list we can see what share of its intended voters say they voted. Five elections, 2019–2022, about 5,100 interviews.
Turnout of each family's supporters, relative to average
1.00 = average. Survey pooled over 2019–2022; ballot-box estimates averaged over the same five elections.
Who the non-voters wanted, before the election
pre-election choice of respondents who later said they did not vote, vs. those who did (pooled; 161 non-voters who named a list)
Maps
One dot per ballot box, sized by eligible voters, at its polling station. The map follows the election picker. Scroll or pinch to zoom, drag to pan, hover for details.
The method, in one box
Ballot box i has Ni eligible voters and vij votes for list j; uij = potential supporters of j in box i; rj = participation rate.
Hypothetical 2 is solved by iterating to a fixed point. Numerically it equals a Goodman ecological regression Ni = Σj vij/rj with 1/r ≥ 1, which gives the bootstrap ranges (resampling towns). A variant that splits only the non-voters (weights ∝ vij/rj) and lands within ~3 points of Hypothetical 1.
Caveats
- Hypothetical 2 hits its ceiling. In most elections one to four lists sit at 100% (Yesh Atid, Blue and White, Yamina, New Hope, National Unity). That means the model's assumptions are off: their boxes turn out highly for other reasons. Treat it as an upper bound on within-box gaps.
- Double envelopes are left out of the estimates (6–10% of votes) and added back unchanged in the seat counts.
- Map locations are approximate. There is only one polling-station layer (2026), so every election's boxes are matched to it by box number: 85% exact in 2022, 72–77% in 2009–2020. The rest go to the nearest-numbered box in the same town. The same matching gives the socio-economic cluster.
- The abroad correction uses the 2022 census for every year. Emigration patterns by town change slowly, but earlier years are an approximation.
- All ballot-box estimates use aggregate data (ecological inference). The survey is the only individual-level check, and it relies on self-reports.
Data and code
| Election results | Central Elections Committee, results by ballot box, 18th–25th Knesset (data.gov.il votes-knesset, datastore API). |
| Polling stations | govmap layer 243675 (Knesset-26 polling stations) via over.org.il; CBS 2008-census socio-economic cluster of the surrounding statistical area (govmap layer 311). |
| Census | CBS Census 2022, selected data by locality (data.gov.il dataset 2022): population, age, foreign residents, origin. |
| Abroad, national | CBS pre-election releases, via ynet (2026), Times of Israel (2022), ynet (2013), Ministry of Education civics brief (2019). |
| Fly-in voters | Fly&Vote / AID Coalition estimates and survey via Jerusalem Post and VIN News; AP (25 Oct 2026); Walla (Arkia CEO); ynet (Likud petition). |
| Survey | Israel National Election Studies: pre/post panels for April 2019, September 2019, 2020, 2021 and 2022, with the study's panel weights. |