Who stays home on election day?

Ballot-box results from eight Knesset elections (2009–2022), used to estimate how often each list's supporters actually vote and what the Knesset would look like if everyone voted. Checked against voters living abroad and against the Israel National Election Study surveys.

Shmuel San · October 2026 · data: Central Elections Committee, CBS census 2022, INES, govmap
Election
changes every per-election chart

Key terms in plain words

Eligible votersבעלי זכות בחירה (בז"ב)
Everyone on the voter register for a ballot box. Citizens who moved abroad stay on the register, so this count is too high (see "Voters living abroad").
Turnout
Votes cast ÷ eligible voters. Here it is counted per ballot box, without the "double envelope" votes (soldiers, diplomats, patients, prisoners), so it is a few points below the official national figure.
Potential supporters
The people who would vote for a list if everyone voted: the list's voters plus the non-voters who lean towards it. Nobody observes this number; it has to be estimated.
Participation rate
A list's votes ÷ its potential supporters. A rate of 60% means 6 in 10 of the list's would-be voters actually voted.
Hypothetical 1
"Non-voters lean like their neighbours." In each ballot box, split the people who didn't vote in the same proportions as the people who did. A list then has a low rate only if its voters live in low-turnout places. This is the cautious estimate.
Hypothetical 2
"Each list has its own rate everywhere." Find one rate per list that best explains why some boxes turn out more than others with the same vote mix. Statistically this is an ecological regression. It can find gaps within a box, but it is fragile.
Full-turnout Knesset
Seats if every list got all its potential supporters, allocated with the 3.25% threshold and the Bader-Ofer (D'Hondt) formula.
Ballot-box sector
Arab box: Arab lists won over half the valid votes. Haredi box: Shas + UTJ won over half. General: all other boxes.
Netanyahu bloc
The lists that backed Netanyahu in coalition talks after that election: Likud, Shas, UTJ and the religious right, plus Kulanu and Yisrael Beiteinu in the years they sat with him.

Participation by list

How many of each list's potential supporters voted

Hypothetical 1Hypothetical 2Hypothetical 2, 90% range (bootstrap)overall turnout
How to read it

Dots right of the grey line are lists whose supporters vote more than average. A dot at 100% means the model hit its ceiling: a warning sign, not a measurement. Hover a row for all estimates.

Vote share now vs. if everyone voted

% of the vote; lists over ~1%

ActualHyp. 1Hyp. 2

Seats with the 3.25% threshold and Bader-Ofer. Surplus-vote agreements are ignored, so "actual" can be off by one seat from the official result.

Would full turnout change the government?

The one result that holds across methods: the Arab lists gain. Arab-majority ballot boxes vote at 43–64%, against 62–68% in general boxes. Under Hypothetical 1 the Arab lists gain 1–6 seats in every election. From 2019 on, those seats come mostly out of the Netanyahu bloc: in 2022 it falls from a majority to 60 seats.

Netanyahu-bloc seats, actual and at full turnout

Actual (computed)Hyp. 1Hyp. 261-seat majority

Exercise: only non-Haredi Jewish supporters turn out

The scenario above raises turnout for everyone. Here only the supporters of non-Haredi Jewish lists are brought to 100% (Likud, the centre, the left, the religious right, Yisrael Beiteinu). The Arab lists and the Haredi lists (Shas, UTJ) keep exactly the votes they got. Think of a mobilisation campaign aimed only at the Jewish non-Haredi public.

Netanyahu-bloc seats when only non-Haredi Jewish supporters turn out

ActualHyp. 1, Jewish non-Haredi onlyHyp. 2, Jewish non-Haredi only61
What happens. Within the Jewish non-Haredi lists, the two camps move only a little against each other under Hypothetical 1. Likud gains a few seats, and so do Yesh Atid and Blue and White. The big effect is on the lists held fixed. Their votes don't change, but the total grows, so their share falls. The Arab lists lose 4–6 seats in every election up to 2021, and Shas and UTJ lose one to three. In 2022 Ra'am and Hadash-Ta'al both fall below the 3.25% threshold, so the Arab lists drop to zero seats, while Meretz climbs above it (4 seats). Net effect in 2022: the Netanyahu bloc rises from 63 to 65. Its Jewish voters gained little ground; most of the gain comes from Arab votes that are wasted below the threshold.

Where the turnout gap comes from

Ballot-box turnout by sector

votes cast ÷ eligible voters, per election

GeneralHarediArab

Turnout by neighbourhood socio-economic level

GeneralHarediArab

Haredi boxes always vote most (69–75%). Arab-box turnout swings the most: 43% in 2021, when the Joint List split, and 64% in 2020, when the united list won 15 seats. In general boxes turnout climbs with the neighbourhood's socio-economic cluster, from about 50% to 71%. Arab and Haredi boxes show no such climb.

Fifteen years of participation rates

Lists come and go, so they are grouped into families. Each cell is the family's votes ÷ its potential supporters.

Centre = Kadima, Yesh Atid, Hatnuah, Kulanu, Blue and White, New Hope, National Unity. Religious right = National Union, Jewish Home, Yachad, New Right, Yamina, Otzma, Religious Zionism. Arab lists = Hadash, Balad, Ra'am, Ta'al and their joint lists.

Voters living abroad

Israel has no postal voting, and citizens who move abroad stay on the register. So every ballot box carries some "phantom" voters who could not vote even if they wanted to. The CBS publishes a national estimate before each election:

Taking them out raises 2022 turnout among people actually living in Israel from the official 70.6% to about 77%. Abroad voters are not spread evenly. The census shows where they are: compare each town's registered voters with its adult residents in the 2022 census.

Registered voters per adult resident, by town

2022 register ÷ census-2022 adults; towns over 10,000 people; dot size = population

Jewish majorityArab / Druze majority (no origin data; placed at left)
How to read it

A ratio of 1.25 means the register has 25% more names than there are adults living in the town. The excess grows with the share of residents born in Europe, mostly the former USSR (correlation among Jewish towns). Tel Aviv, Ra'anana and Eilat are high for other reasons: Anglo emigration, young people registered at a parent's address, seasonal workers. Haredi and Arab towns sit near 1.

Participation rates after removing the excess,

each box's eligible count cut by its town's 2022 excess registration (grey = before). Before 2022 this assumes the same town pattern.

beforeHyp. 1 afterHyp. 2 after
What this changes. The correction removes about 650,000 names nationally, close to the CBS figure of about 590,000. Under Hypothetical 1 all lists rise by similar amounts, so the ranking is unchanged. Under Hypothetical 2 Labor jumps from 47% to 69% and Meretz from 40% to 52% (2022): much of their "low turnout" was Tel Aviv–area phantom voters. Yisrael Beiteinu only rises from 27% to 34%. A town-level correction cannot see FSU emigrants concentrated in particular neighbourhoods, and the survey below suggests YB's true gap is small.

Expats flying in to vote (Knesset 26, 27 Oct 2026)

Israelis abroad can vote only by flying home. Ahead of the 2026 election this became an organised effort. The AID Coalition's Fly&Vote project estimates 53,000–67,000 expats will come. Its survey of about 23,000 Israelis abroad found 80% intending to travel (48% from the US, 37% from Europe). Only 14% of them said they flew in for 2022. The sample is self-selected, and Arkia's CEO says flights are not full. Likud petitioned against the project; the Elections Committee rejected the petition after the organisers said they do not fund tickets. Nobody has measured how these voters will vote. The ballot-box data can answer three narrower questions.

1. Where the voters living abroad are registered

estimated abroad registrants = 2022 register − census adults, by town; top 15 of ~650,000. Bar label: Netanyahu-bloc share of the town's 2022 vote.

2. If they vote like their home towns

2022 vote shares, weighted by each town's abroad registrants, vs. the national result

Netanyahu blocOther Jewish listsArab lists
How to read it

Tel Aviv alone holds about 13% of the abroad registrants, and Haifa, Ra'anana, Herzliya and Ramat Gan add more. So "voting like home" tilts against the bloc, but only by about 4 points (44.7% vs. 48.3%). Expats are not their home towns. Reports suggest the post-2022 emigrants lean further to the centre-left, and some fly in for the bloc. The simulation below therefore varies the split.

3. Netanyahu-bloc seats with fly-in voters added to the 2022 result

rows: fly-in voters; columns: share voting against the bloc. Within each camp, votes split like the home-town profile. 2022 computed result: seats.

Fewest extra votes for one list that would have moved one seat between the camps in 2022, on the computed allocation (surplus agreements ignored).

What it means. One Knesset seat is about valid votes. 60,000 fly-in voters split 70/30 give a net margin of about 24,000 votes, roughly half a seat. Whether that moves a seat depends on where the lists sit relative to the rounding points, and in 2022 that was asymmetric. UTJ was 1,400 votes and Likud 11,000 votes from an extra seat, so a 70/30 lean towards the bloc adds a seat from about 60,000 fly-ins. Against the bloc, the big lists were far from their next seats, so nothing moves until about 100,000 fly-ins at 90/10. At that point Meretz crosses the 3.25% line (it missed by 4,000 votes) and the bloc loses two seats. The real leverage is concentration: 4,200 votes for Meretz alone would have cost the bloc a seat. A few thousand coordinated expat votes for a list near the threshold can matter more than 60,000 spread out. After 27 October the ballot-box results will allow a direct test: did turnout rise more in the boxes with many abroad registrants (Tel Aviv, Haifa, Ra'anana, Herzliya) than elsewhere?

What the surveys say

The Israel National Election Study (INES, Tel Aviv University) interviews the same people before and after each election. Before: "which list would you vote for?" After: "did you vote?". So for every list we can see what share of its intended voters say they voted. Five elections, 2019–2022, about 5,100 interviews.

Turnout of each family's supporters, relative to average

1.00 = average. Survey pooled over 2019–2022; ballot-box estimates averaged over the same five elections.

Survey (self-reported)Hyp. 1Hyp. 2

Who the non-voters wanted, before the election

pre-election choice of respondents who later said they did not vote, vs. those who did (pooled; 161 non-voters who named a list)

Non-votersVoters
Reading the survey. People over-report voting: about 90% say they voted, against roughly 77% real turnout among residents. So the levels are too high, but the ranking is informative, and it matches Hypothetical 1: Arab lists clearly lowest, Yisrael Beiteinu a little below average, Shas and the religious right above. The survey does not support Hypothetical 2's big gaps (Centre at 1.5× average, Yisrael Beiteinu at half). Among people who named a list and then stayed home, 20% were Arab-list supporters (8% among voters) and 32% Likud (27% among voters).

Maps

One dot per ballot box, sized by eligible voters, at its polling station. The map follows the election picker. Scroll or pinch to zoom, drag to pan, hover for details.

election: use the picker at the top

The method, in one box

Notation

Ballot box i has Ni eligible voters and vij votes for list j; uij = potential supporters of j in box i; rj = participation rate.

Hypothetical 1:   uij = vij · Ni / Σk vik
Hypothetical 2:   uij = (vij / rj) · Ni / Σk (vik / rk),   rj = min( Σi vij / Σi uij, 1 ),  iterated to a fixed point
Rate and full-turnout share:   rj = Vj / Uj,   sharej = Uj / Σk Uk

Hypothetical 2 is solved by iterating to a fixed point. Numerically it equals a Goodman ecological regression Ni = Σj vij/rj with 1/r ≥ 1, which gives the bootstrap ranges (resampling towns). A variant that splits only the non-voters (weights ∝ vij/rj) and lands within ~3 points of Hypothetical 1.

Caveats

Data and code

Election resultsCentral Elections Committee, results by ballot box, 18th–25th Knesset (data.gov.il votes-knesset, datastore API).
Polling stationsgovmap layer 243675 (Knesset-26 polling stations) via over.org.il; CBS 2008-census socio-economic cluster of the surrounding statistical area (govmap layer 311).
CensusCBS Census 2022, selected data by locality (data.gov.il dataset 2022): population, age, foreign residents, origin.
Abroad, nationalCBS pre-election releases, via ynet (2026), Times of Israel (2022), ynet (2013), Ministry of Education civics brief (2019).
Fly-in votersFly&Vote / AID Coalition estimates and survey via Jerusalem Post and VIN News; AP (25 Oct 2026); Walla (Arkia CEO); ynet (Likud petition).
SurveyIsrael National Election Studies: pre/post panels for April 2019, September 2019, 2020, 2021 and 2022, with the study's panel weights.